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Torts
William E. Crawford

I. LOUISIANA SHOULD TURN TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WITH A STATE TORTS
CLAIMS ACT

A. Chamberlain Holds the Cap on DamagesAgainst the State
Unconstitutional
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5106(B)(1) provides that: "In any suit for
personal injury, the total amount recoverable, exclusive of medical care and
related benefits and loss of earnings, and loss of future earnings, as provided in
this Section, shall not exceed $500,000." Chamberlainv. State of Louisiana
holds that this damages ceiling contravenes the constitutional proscription against
sovereign immunity contained in Louisiana Constitution article XII, section 10.2
In 1987, three high school classmates were playing "King of the Mountain"
on one of two bulkheads constructed to protect a bridge over the Houma Canal.
Seventeen-year-old Chad Chamberlain was thrown off the bulkhead, remained
under water for nearly fifteen minutes, was rescued, but suffered severe brain
damage. His parents filed suit on behalf of themselves and their son against the
Department of Transportation and Development ("DOTD"), and others, claiming
that the bulkhead was under DOTD's control and that the electrical system on
the bulkhead was defective. Plaintiffs claimed that the electrical system used to
electrify navigation lanterns partially electrified the water surrounding the
bulkheads, causing the boy's injuries. a
The district court awarded the plaintiffs $2,000,000 in general damages and
then reduced them proportionately to fit within the cap mandated by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 13:5106(B)(1); the plaintiffs' total general damage award was
$500,000. Plaintiffs were also awarded $3,453,781.42 in special damages for
past and future medical expenses and loss of earning capacity. The appellate
court affirmed the decision in all respects, including the finding that the statutory
cap was constitutional.4
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted plaintiffs' application for writs and
directly addressed the constitutionality of the "caps" provision. The court noted
that Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5106(B)(1), enacted by Act 452 of 1985, was
"one of six separate statutory measures the legislature, for perceived good
reasons, enacted in 1985 to relieve the state of some of the ordinary burdens of

Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(1) (1991).
Chamberlain v. State, 624 So. 2d 874, 875 (La. 1993).
Id. at 876.
Chamberlain v. State, 621 So. 2d 1118 (La. App. 1st Cir.), rev'd, 624 So. 2d 874 (1993).
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tort liability." 5 After delineating the reasons prompting the enactment of the
ceiling on general damages, the court determined that the legislative goal behind
the enactment was to protect the public fisc. 6 The court said that it was not its
role to consider the wisdom of the adoption7 of the caps statute, rather, its duty
was to determine the legality of the statute.
The court reviewed its powers with respect to the legislature, noting that
plenary power in the legislature is the rule, whereas prohibitions on the exercise
of particular powers is the exception. The court further noted that the party
challenging a statute's validity, to overcome the presumption of constitutionality
afforded all statutes, must articulate a particular constitutional provision limiting
the legislature's powers. With these principles in mind, the court maintained that
the constitutionality of the caps statute depended upon the meaning of Louisiana
Constitution article XII, section 10.8
The plaintiffs argued that the provision created a constitutional right to sue
the state in tort which could not be legislatively curtailed. The DOTD
contended, however, that sovereign immunity was judicially abolished before the
1974 Constitution, that the constitutional enactment was merely an attempt to
elevate the abrogation to constitutional status, and that its adoption was not
intended to abridge the legislature's exclusive power to limit liability. The
DOTD cited Sibley v. Board of Supervisors9 for the general proposition that
limiting recoverable tort damages does not contravene Louisiana Constitution
article XII, section 10(A). I
The court focused on the prohibition against immunity from liability
provided in Louisiana Constitution article XII, section 10(A). Prior to 1960, courts
construed the provision as it then existed "as doing no more than giving the
legislature the power to waive the traditional sovereign immunity from suit, but not
the immunity from substantive tort liability."" The supreme court had held that

5. Chamberlain, 624 So. 2d at 878 (footnotes omitted).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 879.
8. La. Const. art. XII, § 10, states:
A. No Immunity in Contract and Tort. Neither the state, a state agency, nor a political
subdivision shall be immune from suit and liability in contract or for injury to person or
property.
B. Waiver in Other Suits. The legislature may authorize other suits against the state, a
state agency, or a political subdivision. A measure authorizing suit shall waive immunity
from suit and liability.
C. Procedure; Judgments. The legislature shall provide a procedure for suits against the
state, a state agency, or a political subdivision. It shall provide for the effect of a
judgment, but no public property or public funds shall be subject to seizure. No judgment
against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision shall be exigible, payable or
paid except from funds appropriated therefor by the legislature or by the political
subdivision against which judgment is rendered.
9. 462 So. 2d 149, on reh'g, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985).
10. Chamberlain, 624 So. 2d at 879.
11. Id. at 880.
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any attempt by the legislature to waive the state's immunity from liability would
violate the constitutional provision. 1 2 Then in 1960, a constitutional amendment
was added to the liability language, assuring that any waiver of immunity would be
both from suit and from liability. The court then found, in Hamilton v. City of
Shreveport, 3 that the 1960 amendment made each legislative authorization of suit
a waiver of immunity from both suit and from liability. 4
In light of their history, the court construed Article XII, section 10(A) and
10(B) of the Louisiana Constitution as continuing the same immunity from liability
policy as existed pre-1974. Specifically, the legislative waiver authorized by
Section 10(B), when given, must be both from suit and from liability. 5 The court
concluded:
The framers [of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974] obviously did not
intend to change-broaden or widen-the meaning of the immunity from
liability language. Rather, the framers intended to give constitutional
status to the proscription against immunity from substantive tort liability.
The only real difference is that the framers removed the former discretionary right to consent to suit and liability in tort from the legislature and
reserved that right inviolate to the people, making that right a concrete
one, beyond the legislature's reach. 6
With this conclusion stated as a premise, the court then considered whether
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5106(B)(1) unconstitutionally "contravenes that
proscription against sovereign immunity from substantive tort liability."' 7 To
provide a framework for its analysis, the court addressed each sub-section of
Article XII, section 10 separately:
1. Section 10(A) represents a compromise between complete abrogation
and categorization, and is a self-executing mandatory prohibition against
immunity in tort.' 8
2. Section 10(B) employs permissive, legislative waiver language, which
retains "some vestige of sovereign immunity as a viable doctrine."' 9
3. Section 10(C), aimed at protecting the public fisc, gives the legislature
the power to establish the procedures for suits authorized under Sections
10(A) and 10(B).20

12. Id.
13. 247 La. 784, 174 So. 2d 529 (1965).
14. Chamberlain, 624 So. 2d at 881.
15. See generally Lee Hargrave, "Statutory" and "Horatoy" Provisions of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 43 La. L. Rev. 647, 652-53 (1983).
16. Chamberlain, 624 So. 2d at 881.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 881-82.
19. Id. at 882.
20. Id. at 882-83.
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Based on the above analysis, the court determined that regardless of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5106's explicit disclaimer that the legislature's
intent was not to resurrect sovereign immunity, "we ...are bound by the
wording of the constitutional provision and by our prior jurisprudence to reach
a contrary result." 2' The ceiling on damages, the court found, cannot be
"construed as anything other than a partial resurrection of sovereign immunity,"
such that "the statutory ceiling on general damages imposed by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 13:5106(B)(1) conflicts with Section 10(A) and is thus
unconstitutional. 2 2 According to the court, to limit the state's liability to
$500,000 is, in effect, to immunize the state from liability. "Section 10(A)'s
unequivocal, self-executing waiver of sovereign immunity as to suit and liability
in contract and tort cases constrains the legislature and the courts from imposing
limitations on this constitutional right to sue the state. 23
Having stated this unequivocal position, the court was then left with the
unenviable task of contradicting its previous decision in Sibley,24 wherein the
court had stated that the constitution's denial of immunity from suit in tort did
not support the contention that the constitutional provision "prohibits the
Legislature's limiting in any respect recoverable tort damages."25
The court noted that although Sibley lacked precedential value because full
rehearing was granted, it was, in fact, frequently relied upon by other courts and
commentators; therefore, the court proceeded to attack its earlier analysis in
Sibley. Significantly, the court determined that even though neither the language
of Section 10(A) nor the constitutional debates contained any expression, explicit
or implicit, indicating an intent to prohibit the legislature from enacting statutes
limiting recoverable tort damages, upon further analysis, the court found its
"statement in Sibley I that Section 10(A) does not implicitly prohibit such
statutes was incorrect as it overlooks Section 10(A)'s historical underpinnings,
... and its self-executing nature and the implied prohibitions resulting
therefrom. 26
The court also, rather cursorily, rejected the argument that under Section
10(C) the legislature is authorized to refuse to pay judgments, and is thus
implicitly authorized to limit recoverable tort damages. The court said that
Section 10(C) deals with the effect of judgments and does not come into play
until the judgment is rendered, and thus only addresses the claimant's ability to
enforce the judgment. 27 Addressing the claimant's ability to enforce the

21. Id. at 883.
22. Id. at 884.
23. Id. at 885.
24. Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149, on reh'g, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985)
(finding that La. R.S. 40:1299.39, which provided for a $500,000 damages cap on malpractice suits
against the state, did not violate La. Const. art. XII, § 10).
25. Sibley, 462 So. 2d at 154, quoted in Chamberlain, 624 So. 2d at 885.
26. Chamberlain, 624 So. 2d at 886-87.
27. Id. at 888.

1994]

TORTS

judgment is within the legislature's control, whereas addressing a claimant's
ability to go to court and get a judgment against the state is not.
Perhaps the court should have given more consideration to the last argument.
Regardless of the stage in the proceedings at which the legislature may interpose
its power, its constitutional authority to limit the enforcement of the judgment
surely cannot be squared with the court's interpretation of Section 10(A).
B. The Threat of FinancialDisaster to the State is-Real
According to informal data,2" appropriations for judgments against the
Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, through 1988, were:

YEAR
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

LOUISIANA LEGISLATURE
$ 179,448.75
570,321.19
67,209.96
439,996.43
581,511.33
1,918,298.25
1,807,583.83
1,417,897.83
5,590,721.62
2,904,947.50
7,297,547.98
12,689,196.96
13,394,238.22
44,725,240.88
11,341,159.00
27,811,448.00
5,918,840.5229

Information from the Office of Risk Management shows that claims
payments from the Office of Risk Management for actions against the state in
all major categories of liability amounted to:
FISCAL YEAR 1991-1992: $ 25,901,607.00
FISCAL YEAR 1992-1993: $ 45,735,944.0030

28. This data was gathered and presented by proponents of tort reform at legislature committee
hearings in the Regular Session of 1989.
29. This last figure for 1988 may be artificially low given that DOTD transferred a number of
cases to other administrative divisions of the state.
30. Information gathered by author from the Office of Risk Management.
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Significant milestones precipitated the foregoing chronology of tort costs to
the state. In 1973, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Board of Commissioners v.
Splendor Shipping & EnterprisesCo. 31 held that the "Board of Commissioners
of the Port of New Orleans, and other such boards and agencies are not immune
from suit for tort." The supreme court was free to write such an opinion because
sovereign immunity was then a creature of the jurisprudence, not of the
Louisiana Constitution. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 in Article XII,
32
section 10(A) explicitly abrogated the state's immunity from tort liability.
The next and perhaps even more significant event came in 1980, when in Jones
v. City of Baton Rouge" the Louisiana Supreme Court held that strict liability
under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317 applied to the state and other governmental entities. At this point, the stage for financial disaster was completely set.
While cause and effect may be infinitely debated, the above chronological
tabulation of liability strongly suggests that the state's increasing liability is
directly linked to the aforementioned events. Taking into account the typical
time delay from accident to final judgment, it is clear that an escalation began
quite dramatically after the constitutional change of 1974. Then, beginning in
1983, the full effect of abrogated immunity, together with strict liability, began
to take effect; the astronomical rise in state payments culminated in 1985 with
DOTD alone paying out in excess of $44 million. 34 The state's reaction was
immediate. Six statutes were enacted in 1985, 3 one being a very minimal torts
claims act with a cap on damages, 36 another being a very effective limitation
of the theory of strict liability in suits against the state or governmental
entities. a7 Because the $500,000 cap on damages was not retroactive, the effect

31. 273 So. 2d 19, 26 (La. 1973).
32. La. Const. art. XII. § 10(A).
33. 388 So. 2d 737, 740 (La. 1980).
34. See supra note 30.
35. Besides La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(1) (1991), enacted by 1985 La. Acts No. 452, and the two
statutes mentioned in this sentence, the other three statutes are as follows:
(1) La. R.S. 13:5114(D) (1991), enacted by 1985 La. Acts No. 450, authorizing structured
payment plans by governmental defendants to satisfy personal injury and wrongful death
claims;
(2) La. R.S. 42:1441.1-1441.4 (1990) and La. R.S. 29:23.1 (1989), enacted by 1985 La.
Acts No. 451, limiting the state's master-servant liability, and transferring liability for torts
committed by local public officials from the state to the particular subdivision the officer
serves;

(3) La. R.S. 9:2798.1 (1991), enacted by 1985 La. Acts No. 453, precluding governmental entities and their officers and employees from incurring liability for policy-making or
discretionary acts or omissions.
See Kenneth M. Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in the Law, 1984-85, 46 La. L.
Rev. 491, 512-33 (1986).
36. La. R.S. 13:5112(C) (1991), enacted by 1985 La. Acts No. 509, and La. R.S. 13:5117, enacted
by 1985 La. Acts No. 509, but repealed by 1989 La. Acts No. 754, providing for court costs and
limiting pre-judgment interest on personal injury and wrongful death claims against governmental
defendants to six percent.
37. La. R.S. 9:2800 (1991), enacted by 1985 La. Acts No. 454, limiting the liability of
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was not seen immediately, but in 1988, the appropriation for DOTD tort liability
dropped significantly. The fiscal year figures for 1991-92 and 1992-93 are for
the entire state, not just DOTD. Even with the cap on damages effectively in
place, and with the limitation of strict liability in force, our most recent payout
38
exceeds $45 million.
To support its decision and announce the reasons behind it, the legislature
included in Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5106 the following statement of
purpose:
E. The legislature finds and states:
(1) That judgments against public entities have exceeded ability to pay
on current basis.
(2) That the public fisc is threatened by these judgments to the extent
that the general health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry may be
threatened.
(3) That the limitations set forth in this Section are needed to curb the
trend of governmental liability abuses, to balance an individual's claim
against the needs of the public interests and the common good of the
whole society, and to avoid overburdening Louisiana's economy and its
taxpaying citizens with even more new and/or increased taxes than are
already needed for essential programs.
(4) That the purpose of this Section is not to reestablish an immunity
based on the status of sovereignty but rather to clarify the substantive
content and parameters of application of such legislatively created codal
articles and laws and also to assist in the implementation of Article II
of the constitution.39
The state is a poor vehicle for loss distribution. However, this principle,
along with the "deep pocket" theory, drives our appellate courts' approach to tort
development.' The fact is that the state has a very limited pocket and can pay

governmental entities under La. Civ. Code art. 2317 for things, other than buildings, in their custody
to situations where the governmental entity had notice of the defect that caused the injury.
38. See supra note 30.

39. La. R.S. 13:5106(E) (1991).
40. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 116 (La. 1986), superseded by
statute, La. R.S. 9:2800.51 etseq. (1991) (emphasis added) ("The underlying reason for the owner's
or guardian's strict liability is that the person to whom society allots the supervision, care or
guardianship (custody) of the risk-creating person or thing should bear the loss resulting from
creation of the risk, rather than some innocent third person harmed as a consequence of his failure
to prevent the risk."); Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 168 (La. 1985) (emphasis added)
("For the most part, however, because of the difficulty in finding fault for all times and purposes, the
Code has left the function of defining fault in the hands of the courts."); Turner v. Bucher, 308 So.
2d 270, 274 (La. 1975) ("Nevertheless, an innocent victim should not be denied reparation if there
exists a source of financial responsibility ....");Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841,
862 (5th Cir. 1967) ("Until Americans have acomprehensive scheme of social insurance, courts must
resolve by a balancing process the head on collision between the need for adequate recovery and
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its tort liability only from tax revenues. If a referendum was held, would the
public support a proposal that increased taxes to finance the state's growing tort
liability? The success of such a measure is doubtful.
C. What Approach is Best for the State in the Face of the Rapid Escalation
of Tort Liability?
As Professor Robertson stated in his comprehensive article on governmental
tort liability, "Louisiana's present scheme of governmental immunity from torts
is a hodgepodge of provisions whose contours remain uncertain and whose
constitutionality is often questionable. Louisiana could be better served by a
comprehensive tort claims act like those in existence at the federal level and in
'
many states."41
In view of the inclination of the Louisiana Supreme Court to eliminate
sovereign immunity or any limitation of liability against the state, a constitutional
amendment is needed, similar to Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5106, that
recognizes the legislature's right to limit, but not eliminate, the state's liability.
The state legislature would then have constitutional authority to control issues of
immunity. Nineteen states have followed that general scheme.42 Generally a
valid exercise of legislative power to limit the tort immunity of the government,
the foregoing scheme has been upheld in the face of equal protection attacks
because courts find that the limitation of immunity is rationally related to
protecting public funds.4 a Additionally, as presently exists in numerous

viable enterprises."). Prior to 1975, this "fault" required to hold a person liable was defined in terms
of negligence. The defendant was not liable unless he failed to act as a reasonable person, or failed
to use reasonable care, under the circumstances, even though some harm occurred from the person's
conduct. See also Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, A Legal and Economic Analysis, 39-67
(1970); George L. Priest, The Invention ofEnterprise Liability: A Critical History ofthe Intellectual
Foundation of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461, 470-71 (1985); and Fowler V. Harper et al.,
The Law of Torts (2d ed. 1986). According to the Harper textbook, "[Wle may well be in a stage
of transition toward some form of social insurance for accident victims." Id. § 12.1, at 103. "Thus
the possible objectives of tort law in accident cases may be classified as the moral objective, the
compensation objective, the admonitory or deterrent objective, and the objectives of avoiding
discouragement of desirable activity, economic waste, and a disproportionate burden on any members
or groups in society." Id. § 11.5, at 98-99. Three systems of loss spreading exist: social inturance,
private risk pooling insurance, and enterprise liability, which is imposing costs on those markets
likely to insure or self-insure. Id. § 11.5, at 100-01 n.9. For a more detailed analysis of the deep
pocket theory and loss spreading as part of accident prevention, see id. at 99-101 nn.8-9.
41. David W. Robertson, Tort Liability of Governmental Units in Louisiana, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 857,
858 (1990) (footnote omitted).
42. Civil Actions Against State and Local Government, Its Divisions, Agencies, and Officers, 3436 (Jon L. Craig et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992). These states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. All citations to specific
state constitutional provisions or statutes are found in text.
43. Id. at 178-79.
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states,' this legislative scheme may include a limitation of liability from
punitive damages or pre-judgment interests.
Most importantly, many states provide for statutory caps on damages.45
Specifically, such limitations have been adopted in the following states:

Alabama
Colorado
Florida
Indiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana49
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Wisconsin
Wyoming

SINGLE OCCURRENCE
$ 100,000
150,000

4

AGGREGATE

47

$ 300,000
400,000

100,00048

300,000
200,000
100,000
200,000
100,000
750,000
1,000,000

5,000,000
500,000
600,000
1,000,000
1,500,000

5,000,000

50,000
150,000

500,000

400,000

750,000

100,000
250,000

500,000

100,000
100,00010

1,000,000

250,000
250,000
100,00011
250,000
250,000

1,000,000,

50,000
250,000

500,000
500,00052

500,00054
500,000
1,000,000
500,000

44. Id. at 478-83.
45. Id. at 485-89.
46. Id. at 489-93.
47. Id. at 493-96.
48. There is a $200,000 cap on two or more claims of one person arising out of same incident
or occurrence.
49. Statute terminated June 30, 1993.
50. Claimant may recover additional special damages not exceeding $100,000.
51. This cap is for state government. There is a $500,000 cap for political subdivisions.
52. The cap is $1,000,000 if the injury was caused by a licensed physician or dentist employed
by the governmental entity while that person is in the course and scope of employment.
53. This cap is for local government. The cap for state governments or municipalities is
$250,000.
54. This cap is for state governments and municipalities. There is a $300,000 cap for local
governments.
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It has been widely held that no fundamental right to recover unlimited
damages from governmental entities exists, and that statutory caps are valid in
the face of constitutional attacks based on equal protection, due process, and
open court provisions." Louisiana, however, given Chamberlain's interpretation of its unique constitutional abrogation of sovereign immunity, presently
stands unprotected from unlimited tort liability.
II. CONCLUSION

If the basic statement in the Louisiana Constitution, article XII, section
10(A) were changed from a statement of nonimmunity, as it currently stands, to
a statement of immunity, Louisiana would be afforded the protection from
unlimited liability that it needs. Given Section 10(C)'s delegation of power to
the legislature, Louisiana would have a comprehensive scheme that could be
regulated responsibly by the legislature, instead of one subject to the will of the
appellate courts. A constitutional amendment to accomplish this might be in the
following form:
Immunity from Suit and Liability for the State, a State Agency, or a
PoliticalSubdivision
A. Immunity in Contract and Tort. The state, a state agency, or a
political subdivision shall be immune from suit and liability in contract
or for injury to person or property, except to the extent otherwise
provided by the legislature.
B. Waiver in Other Suits. The legislature may authorize other suits
against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision. A measure
authorizing suit shall waive immunity from suit and liability.
C. Procedure, Judgments. The legislature shall provide a procedure for
suits against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision, and
shall provide for the limitation of their liability. It shall provide for the
effect of a judgment, but no public property or public funds shall be
subject to seizure. No judgment against the state, a state agency, or a
political subdivision shall be exigible, payable or paid except from
funds appropriated therefor by the legislature or by the political
subdivision against which judgment is rendered.56

55. Civil Actions, supra note 42, at 178-79.
56. Cf the present text of La. Const. art. XII, § 10, supra note 8.

